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World accumulation 
and planetary life, 
or, why capitalism 
will not survive until 
the ‘last tree is cut’
Jason W. Moore
Why does it seem easier to imagine the end of the world 
than to see the end of capitalism? Part of the answer turns 
on a rift between radical economic and ecological thought.
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How does capitalism work through the web of  life? How can we begin to understand capitalism not simply as an economic system of  markets and production and a social system of  class 
and culture, but as a way of  organising nature?
I’ve argued that this is a co-produced relation, that capitalism makes nature 
and the web of  life makes capitalism. But how do we come to terms with 
planetary ‘state shifts’ like climate change – dramatic, abrupt, and irreversible 
moments of  planetary change?1 That is, how do we understand the tendency 
towards both planetary crisis and accumulation crisis as two moments of  
a self-forming whole. We have an immediate problem because the way of  
thinking about these questions in the modern world, after five centuries of  
colonialism and scientific revolution and everything else, puts society in one 
box and nature in another. They interact – sort of  – but they are very much 
in different spheres. The answer to these fundamental questions has to begin 
by acknowledging that the planetary state shift recognised by earth system 
scientists requires an intellectual and political state shift: a radical shift in how 
we think about the relations between humans and the rest of  nature.
CAPITALISM AND THE ‘FOUR CHEAPS’
Crucial to my thinking has been a family of  ideas that seek to show how 
capitalism, from its early modern origins, has been not only a mighty 
producer of  changes in the web of  life, but also a product of  that web of  
life, and of  the totality of  transformations between what is usually called 
society and nature. This means that modernity never masters or possesses 
1 Barnosky AD et al (2004) ‘Approaching a State Shift in Earth’s Biosphere,’ Nature, 486, 52–58
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nature. Capital not only never subsumes nature, but it has few effective 
mechanisms for managing its own nature in any given era. The web of  life is 
unruly, rebellious, and has a way of  continually upsetting the best laid plans 
of  states, of  capitalists, of  scientists and engineers.
This is important because the new liberal craze for turning over global 
natures, including human natures, to market-oriented management 
represents an important break in the history of  capitalism. Longstanding 
patterns of  state and imperial governance of  nature have produced a set 
of  conditions of  production which I call Cheap Nature. The Four Cheaps 
– labour power, food, energy and raw materials – are necessary to launch 
and sustain great bursts of  capital accumulation. Today, capital is seeking 
profitable investment opportunities in a world in which there are really 
no more significant frontiers of  Cheap Nature. These are not significant 
enough, in my view, to relaunch another golden age of  capitalism. 
“the new liberal craze for turning over 
global natures, including human natures, 
to market-oriented management represents 
an important historical break in the history 
of capitalism”
The exhaustion of  the Cheap Nature model is happening at a time when, 
thanks to climate change, the very mechanisms of  cheapening labour, food, 
energy and raw materials are not only breaking down – they are reversing 
themselves. The reversal will be, like planetary state shifts, dramatic, 
irreversible – and non-linear. This is most evident in the relationship 
between climate change and the agricultural model of  historical capitalism – 
the Cheap Food model – based on producing more and more calories with 
less and less labour time. It’s a model that’s breaking down because we have 
reached the moment where the enclosure of  the atmospheric commons 
is now supressing yield growth in the world’s four big cereal crops – and 
because terrestrial enclosures of  every kind are now being challenged by 
agrarian and food justice movements of  every kind.
How do we reconcile the dynamics of  planetary crisis and world 
accumulation? The essence of  capital in the modern world is that it 
produces more capital than it can reinvest profitably. This is the surplus 
capital problem. What’s been missed in Marxist political economy is the 
centrality of  Cheap Nature. The truly epoch-making expansions of  the 
modern world have turned on much more than new machines, new markets, 
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and new economic organisations; they been able to soak up surplus capital 
because new domains of  Cheap Nature have been opened up by states and 
empires.2 The resolution of  the surplus capital problem, always a temporary 
resolution, has been fundamentally rooted in the restoration of  these Four 
Cheaps. That’s why great industrialisations and “new” imperialisms have 
always been joined at the hip – there’s no mechanisation of  textiles without 
the massive expansion of  cotton cultivation in the antebellum American 
South, for example. 
How can we understand the systemic interrelation between socioeconomic 
and ecological trends, between something like faltering accumulation and 
sharply rising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere? Effective 
answers are going to have to evolve, but to do that we cannot work in the 
old paradigm of  adding up ecology and economy. The relation is much 
more intimate than such Green Arithmetic allows. We are also going to 
have to take history much more seriously. Clearly, we are at a moment 
of  fundamental shift in the history of  capitalism and in the history 
of  the climate system. We are living through the closing moments of  
the Holocene, a period of  unusual climate stability, which began about 
12,000 years ago. Over that time, mild climate perturbations, compared to 
what we are going to experience, were very important in the histories of  
civilisations. Roman power in the West crumbled quickly after the end of  
the Roman Climate Optimum around 300 C.E.; feudal power withered in 
the face of  a perfect storm of  climate change, disease, and popular revolt 
after 1300. 
This leads to us to ask two big – two really big – questions. Is capitalism 
capable of  surviving through the present climate crisis, which dwarfs 
the climate shifts experienced by Roman and feudal oligarchs? And 
what are the ways that capitalism has re-established its conditions for 
growth and accumulation? 
A compelling answer begins by recognising just how dependent capitalism 
has been on frontiers of  Cheap Nature: those places where food, energy, 
raw materials and workers can be drawn for free or low cost. Most radicals 
– never mind the would-be technocratic managers of  a geoengineered 
climate system – still ignore this history. Somehow it’s easier to denounce 
the environmental degradation, the mass produced violence and genocide, 
the dynamics of  domination, than it is to see how each of  these moments 
2 Moore JW (2017) ‘The Capitalocene, Part II’, The Journal of  Peasant Studies, online in advance of  print
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is linked to the system of  Cheap Nature and the endless accumulation of  
capital. But that won’t do. An understanding of  how capital accumulation 
works, how it unfolds through the web of  life, is fundamental to 
understanding not just why capitalism drives planetary crisis, but how its 
contradictions compel it to continue down this deadly and self-defeating 
path. Such an analysis may also reveal capitalism’s weaknesses – it may serve 
an antidote to the pervasive belief, even among radicals, that capitalism is all-
powerful. It also won’t do to keep the ‘social’ and ‘environmental’ separate 
because the questions of  how capital works, how capitalism destroys life, 
and how modernity requires racialised, gendered, and colonial violence are 
interpenetrated. That interpenetration is key to how capitalism has thrived 
in the past, and to how capitalism’s resilience is now in question.
Our usual understanding of  this planetary crisis comes from a philosophy 
of  history that says “Humans did it!” It’s a philosophy that says the 
drivers of  planetary crisis are anthropogenic. “Humans are overwhelming 
the great forces of  nature” – in the words of  the Popular Anthropocene.3 
“Anthropogenic implicates an actor that 
doesn’t exist. There is no Anthropos, no 
humanity as a unified actor”
There’s a big problem with such explanations. Anthropogenic implicates an 
actor that doesn’t exist. There is no Anthropos, no humanity as a unified 
actor. So, if  not anthropogenic, what? In a word: capitalogenic. Let me be clear 
about this term, and about the idea of  the ‘Capitalocene’. Liberals complain 
that there’s plenty of  responsibility to go around, and that capitalists aren’t 
the only ones to blame. The Capitalocene doesn’t say that the One Percent 
are completely to blame for the crisis. (But, just to be clear, the One Percent 
are completely to blame for the crisis.) The Capitalocene argument isn’t 
about blame; it’s about identifying the system that has devastated life on this 
planet.4 It’s about making clear the history of  capitalism. The Capitalocene is 
a way to begin to ask how the accumulation of  capital, the pursuit of  power 
and the co-production of  nature form an organic and evolving whole. That 
whole is a ‘world-ecology’. To say capitalogenic is therefore to invoke not 
just economics – whatever that might mean – but the power and violence 
that has made endless accumulation possible. Where many radicals see only 
3 Steffen W, Crutzen PJ and McNeill JR (2007) ‘The Anthropocene: Are humans now overwhelming the great 
forces of  nature’, AMBIO: A Journal of  the Human Environment 36, no. 8: 614–21
4 Moore JW (2017) ‘The Capitalocene, Part I: On the Nature and Origins of  Our Ecological Crisis’, The Journal 
of  Peasant Studies, 44, no. 3, 594-630
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capitalism’s entropy, destruction, and devastation, world-ecology embraces 
the life-making alternatives forged in resistance to such domination. To say 
that capitalism creates an ecology of  power, capital, and nature in its own 
image is also to underscore the fragility of  capitalism’s ecologies, and the 
power of  a web of  life that is continually upsetting the plans of  the rich and 
powerful. This is what world-ecology celebrates: the intimate connections 
between the life-making resistances, and emancipatory possibilities, of  a 
web of  life that incudes humans.
CHEAP NATURES AND THE GREAT FRONTIER
Much environmental thinking and social theory says that all the troubles 
started in England with the advent of  coal and steam. Such periodisation 
matters greatly to our politics. For one, this narrative – a very old narrative 
that stretches back more than a century – reveals a long-held love affair with 
big machines. The old Anglo-centric reading of  capitalism has the disabling 
effect of  rendering slavery, colonialism, and gender secondary: we are back to 
the old “forces of  production” argument and its tragic history of  rendering 
Nature a productive asset. It is not even clear that the steam engine was the 
key machine of  industrialisation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Was not the cotton gin arguably more pivotal? Marx thought so, 
when he observed that it was only the enormous fall in the price of  cotton 
that made large-scale industry possible.5 This is no mere historical quibble. 
For the productivist view of  Nature lends itself  quite readily to the view 
of  race and gender as dependent variables, forgetting, as Federici reminds 
us, that the violent binaries of  race and gender were themselves strategic 
pivots of  accumulating surplus work/energy. Racial and gendered formations 
were themselves, if  one can forgive the old-fashioned language, “forces of  
production”. Of  course, these binaries were not invented in the Industrial 
Revolution; they were its fundamental preconditions. 
“The old Anglo-centric reading of 
capitalism has the disabling effect of 
rendering slavery, colonialism, and 
gender secondary: we are back to the 
old ‘forces of production’ argument and 
its tragic history of rendering Nature a 
productive asset”
5  Marx K (1971) Theories of  surplus value, Vol. III, Moscow, Progress Publishers
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If  not the Industrial Revolution of  the long nineteenth century, when 
should we say that capitalism began? In my view, the origins of  capitalism 
are found in what the great French historian Fernand Braudel called the 
“long” sixteenth century, more or less the two centuries after 1450.6 But to 
keep it simple, let’s say 1492, Year Zero of  modern power, genocide, and 
capital accumulation. And let’s call October 12, 1492 the birthday of  Cheap 
Nature. For Columbus was not merely a navigator and conqueror: he was an 
assessor of  Cheap Nature. His diary of  the First Voyage expresses a strong 
desire not merely for gold – mentioned some 70 times – but also to identify 
what kinds of  life could fetch a good price in Europe. Columbus carried 
forth not merely guns, germs and steel, but the keen eye of  an assessor who 
sensed the New World’s potential riches. Columbus channelled the logic of  
Cheap Nature from the very beginning. 
Cheap Nature has never been a bargain. Cheapness is violence; it grows 
from the barrel of  a gun. It’s an utterly irrational system of  rationality, one 
premised on mobilising the work of  all natures – humans included – for 
free, or for as close to free as possible. That’s crucial because capitalism 
is everything that an efficient system is not. Capitalism’s prodigious waste 
of  life and limb is fundamental to its logic. When Marx called capitalism 
a system of  turning children’s blood into capital, he was making a very 
important point. Such inefficiency requires and necessitates violence, at 
once cultural and material. And so Cheap Nature is also necessary because 
capitalism is not even price-rational. Capitalism pursues Cheap Natures 
so relentlessly because the ecology of  capitalism is its precise opposite: 
capitalism’s ecology is expensive. And worse still, it becomes more expensive 
over time, because the fantasy of  endless accumulation feeds on the bodies 
of  finite lives and labours.  
This means that capitalism is not only a system of  Cheap Nature but 
expresses the ethos of  the cheapskate: the capitalist system is one where the 
rich and powerful never pay their bills. They are always too big to fail, too 
powerful to go broke. That there have been plenty of  exceptions should not 
obscure the world-historical pattern. Capitalism is a system of  expensive 
nature and capitalists are always inventing new ways to avoid paying their 
debts. Capitalists don’t want to take on the cost of  raising families, of  
reproducing society, and of  reproducing fields or forests. So, what do you 
do? You go to the frontier. 
6 Braudel F (1953) ‘Qu’est-ce que le XVIe Siècle?’ Annales E.S.C., 8, no. 1, 69-73
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“modernity’s commodity frontiers are not 
simply about commodities; they’re about 
the cultural and territorial projects that 
make possible the appropriation of unpaid 
work/energy – the work of ‘women, nature, 
and colonies’”
Frontiers are just not spaces “out there.” Frontiers are made. Nature doesn’t 
exist as a set of  pre-fabricated use-values; nature’s utilities and work potential 
have to be identified, mapped, secured, and legitimated at every step from 
“raw material” to finished product. We think of  this as an economic and 
technological dynamic, which it is. But it’s also profoundly cultural. So for 
me, modernity’s commodity frontiers are not simply – or even primarily – 
about commodities; they’re about the cultural and territorial projects that 
make possible the appropriation of  unpaid work/energy – the work of  
“women, nature, and colonies”.7 Here we come face to face with what Max 
Weber called the “the European rationality of  world domination”. That 
rationality has been, like racism and sexism, a powerful force of  production, 
an indispensable lever of  what I’ve called accumulation by appropriation. 
This opens our eyes to the ways that the history of  the modern world is not just 
about the bloody violence of  colonialism or the deployment of  big machines. 
It is also about “soft” technologies, like bookkeeping  and cartography. If  
historians today talk about ‘globalisation’ stretching back millennia, there’s no 
question that modern globalisation began with the invention of  the “global” 
through modern cartography. We think of  imperialism as movements of  
armed commerce and militarised production and plunder, and they were. But 
the great innovation of  early capitalism – the trans-oceanic empire – was 
possibly only through maps, like the famous and still hegemonic Mercator 
projection, that allowed one not only to navigate planetary space, but to 
imagine its subordination to the pursuit of  profit and power. It still strikes me 
as curious that we deify the steam engine while relegating the modern map 
to a footnote. But was not modern cartography – and its sibling, modern 
surveying – the very basis of  the modern control of  space, of  global nature, 
of  the creation of  capitalism’s most basic real abstraction, property?
Here was capitalism’s God trick (to borrow from Haraway): to re-present 
the world in “objective” form.8 This trick accomplished two big things: it 
7 Mies M (1986) Patriarchy and accumulation on a world scale, London: Zed
8 Haraway D (1988) ‘Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of  partial 
perspective’, Feminist Studies, 14, no. 3, 575-599
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concealed capital’s desire for domination under the guise of  objectivity and, 
in the same breath, it enabled the practical tasks of  world domination. 
That raises a vexing question for radical thought: How do the practical 
matters of  domination facilitate the practical matters of  exploitation, and 
vice versa? One recent move is to make clear that epoch-making technologies 
under capitalism are fundamentally rooted in the exploitation of  the worker 
by the capitalist. The history of  technology and resources is a history of  class 
struggles between bourgeois and proletarian. That seems to me a valuable 
insight, but also one easily suffocated by the kinds of  formalisms that have so 
often plagued Marxists, and not only Marxists. Too often, the “working class” 
has been defined in ways that bear more than a passing family resemblance to 
the real abstraction, Society. Marxists have too often embraced unduly narrow 
conceptions of  work and “the worker”. For this reason, I’ve emphasised 
work/energy, because we are dealing with work in a broadly biophysical 
sense, comprising the activity and potential energy of  rivers and soils, of  oil 
and coal deposits, of  human-centred production and reproduction.9 
At this point, the critics have objected: “Aha! You are flattening all work. Do 
you not recall how Marx insists that the worst of  architects is better than the 
best of  bees?” Which of  course misses the point. For starters, there are no 
architects without bees – a reality that bears repeating as we learn more about 
colony collapse disorder. But to insist on the essential unity of  work/energy – 
as I think Marx does in the early pages of  Capital – is to establish the basis for 
a more dialectical conception of  work. For Marx, and this is the method I tried 
to follow in Web of  Life, such general abstractions offer a provisional structure 
through which to investigate the irreducibly combined and uneven character 
of  work under capitalism. General abstractions yield to progressively more 
determinate abstractions across the time and space of  historical capitalism. 
Far from reducing all work/energy, identifying the essential connection of  life 
and work in the web of  life allows us to see more clearly how the formalised 
structures of  wage-work fundamentally rely on other – distinctive and no less 
real – forms of  work, by humans and the rest of  nature.
Those other forms of  work are the terrain of  surplus profit realised 
through extra-economic means: accumulation by appropriation. This 
has far-reaching political as well as analytical implications. I think Marx 
glimpsed the danger when he warned the German socialists of  the dangers 
9 Moore JW (2015), Capitalism in the Web of  Life, Verso
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that lay in attributing “supernatural” powers to labour.10 (And where he 
reminded his comrades that labour, too, was a force of  nature in its own 
right.) Masculinism, racism, colonialism, and economism have too often 
infected such thinking with formal definitions of  what, when, and who is a 
worker. To account for “the” Industrial Revolution in terms that elide the 
enclosure of  female bodies within a Lockean “private sphere”, premised on 
the redefinition of  women’s concrete labours as non-work, is of  course to 
ignore the gendered oppression that is directly constitutive of  modern class 
relations. This is more than an assertion that gender matters – which it always 
does. Even if  one maintains an Anglo-centric narrative, there’s no question 
that the relations of  work that defined the Industrial Revolution could not 
exist without birthing and sustaining the modern proletariat – an “event” 
that necessarily predates the nineteenth century. Care work is not a footnote 
to the “real” history of  capitalism’s ecologies; it is the precondition of  those 
ecologies. In other words, attention to the class struggles around who is 
a worker and what constitutes work – struggles unfolding in overlapping 
colonial, racial, and gendered domains – changes the dominant masculinist, 
technology-centred narrative.11
“To account for ‘the’ Industrial Revolution 
in terms that elide the enclosure of female 
bodies within a Lockean ‘private sphere’, 
premised on the redefinition of women’s 
concrete labours as non-work, is of course to 
ignore the gendered oppression that is directly 
constitutive of modern class relations”
To raise the question of  work also unsettles the environmentalist narrative. 
That’s a narrative that, even at its most radical, asks, “What does capitalism 
do to nature?” 
That’s not a bad question to ask, but I want to turn this question inside out. 
I want to ask, “How does capitalism put natures to work?”.
Let me be clear that asking how capitalism mobilises different forms of  
work – the unpaid human work of  social reproduction, the work of  soils 
and streams, the work of  slaves, the work of  industrial workers – implies 
10 Marx K (1978/1875 original) ‘Critique of  the Gotha Programme’, in Tucker R, ed, The Marx-Engels Reader,  
New York: WW Norton, 526
11 Patel R and Moore JW (2017) A History of  the World in Seven Cheap Things, Berkeley, CA: University of  
California Press
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synthesis. To ask how capitalism puts natures of  all kinds to work is also 
to recognise capitalism’s pathology – and its exterminism. Here’s the rub. 
On the one hand, capitalism works, not because it does terrible things 
to natures (it does), but because it has been successful at mobilising and 
appropriating manifold natures for free or low cost. On the other hand, 
those movements of  appropriating Nature have been fantastically violent. 
So violence is fundamental to Cheap Nature – revealing capitalism’s greatest 
“inefficiency”: its destruction and waste of  life.
“Capitalism works, not because it does 
terrible things to natures (it does), 
but because it has been successful at 
mobilising and appropriating manifold 
natures for free or low cost”
Now, this argument seems to have agitated some Marxists. In a kind of  
sectarianism reminiscent of  Spartacist League denunciations, some critics 
think they’ve got me: I care only about accumulation crisis and not about 
the extraordinary violence and devastation wrought by capital at the end of  
the Holocene.12 I think that’s a tough sell for anyone who’s paid attention 
to the argument I’m making. The whole point of  world-ecology is to show 
how human organisation – including capitalism – is not only a producer of  
changes in the web of  life, but a product of  it. That means, among other 
things, that capitalism not only emerged out of  powerful socio-ecological 
changes – the Little Ice Age and two epoch-making waves of  disease (the 
Black Death and New World pandemics) – but also that the longue durée 
of  capital accumulation itself  tends to activate forms of  nature, including 
social movements, that cannot be fixed through a productivist ontology of  
Nature. This is what I’ve called negative-value: an idea that seeks to capture 
the ways in which tipping points across the planetary system are wrapped 
up with the historical drive to accumulate capital and squeeze more work/
energy from humans and the rest of  nature. Negative-value is a way to 
connect the “inside” – capitalism’s ecology – and the outside, the web of  
life a whole. It is, above all, an argument that says capitalism faces real limits 
because of  its relations, historically and in the present, with and within 
planetary life. Those limits are reached because of  the dialectical exhaustion 
of  how capitalism puts natures to work on the Cheap.
12  See, for example, Foster JB (2016) ‘Marxism in the anthropocene: Dialectical rifts on the left’, International 
Critical Thought, 6(3), 393-421
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I am therefore sceptical of  the environmentalist claim that capitalism will 
continue, barring social revolution, until the “last tree is cut”.13 Capitalism is 
much less resilient than the slogan suggests. The tight connection between 
recessions in the advanced capitalist core and energy prices over the past 
four decades is enough to tell us that capitalists start to have big problems 
when basic commodity prices rise. Now imagine that dynamic magnified 
radically in an era of  climate change – an era in which two thirds of  the 
costs of  climate change by 2050 will be borne by world agriculture. Many 
of  the same radicals celebrating the analyses of  planetary state shifts also 
deny the same logic at work within capitalism. Capitalism, too often in 
the radical imagination, assumes supernatural powers, able to withstand 
planetary crises at will. But have we not already witnessed the outlines of  
the essential stagnation of  capitalism’s labour productivity model?14 Labour 
productivity growth has slowed and stagnated dramatically over the past 
four decades – in industry, but also in agriculture, and here the connection 
with climate change is inescapable.
“Capitalism, too often in the radical 
imaginary, becomes a steamroller of 
entropy, able to withstand planetary forces 
at will. But have we not already witnessed 
the outlines of the essential stagnation of 
capitalism’s labour productivity model?”
To grasp capitalism as a system of  putting Nature to work, we need to 
take work seriously. That involves re-centring how we think capitalism in 
the web of  life – away from consumption and population, and towards 
work. When I say Nature, I mean Nature in the uppercase, as a real, 
lived abstraction through which the structures of  capital and power fuse 
with the structures of  feeling. Here is Nature as a way of  organising 
something far more important than fields and mountains and streams and 
forests: the real abstraction Nature has been a vital tool in the cultures of  
racialised, gendered, and colonial domination. Not just the idea, but the 
institutionalisation of  Nature as real abstraction has been central to a longue 
durée process of  expelling dominated groups of  humans from membership 
in Society. This was true in the English conquest of  Ireland – out of  which 
emerged the contemporary meaning of  words like Nature, Society, and 
13 Foster JB (2009) The Ecological Revolution, New York: Monthly Review Press, 206
14 Gordon RJ (2017) The Rise and Fall of  American Growth, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
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European – and it remains true today, as we see in the mass incarcerations 
of  peoples of  colour in the United States. These were, and are, colonial 
populations expelled from Society – but geographically enclosed within the 
capitalist division of  coerced labour. 
One is always rightly wary of  functionalist explanations. But it seems clear 
that the mobilisation of  Cheap Nature has always been at the core of  such 
expulsions – so different from the xenophobia of  pre-modern civilizations. 
For these were expulsions to keep populations inside and dominated, to 
expel them from Society while incorporating their labors for bourgeois 
enrichment.  This allows us to move from consumption as the meta-concept 
of  environmental thought towards work, and to begin to think through the 
history of  capitalism within the web of  life – and the web of  life within 
capitalism – in different ways. 
I’ve picked on environmentalist thought, but we can’t let Marxist thought 
off  the hook either. Marxism has always had a tough time with the dialectics 
of  capital accumulation and capitalist systems of  power. Allow me to 
highlight what I see as a core mis-reading of  Marx’s political economy. 
Marxists have long taken for granted the identity of  the commodity form 
and the relations that made that commodity. “Value relations” have long 
been read as class relations that derive from, or are located in relation to, the 
immediate process of  production. But there’s a wider sphere of  power that 
works to take in the Four Cheaps – labour, energy, raw materials and food 
– that sustain the production and expanded reproduction of  commodities. 
That wider arena is crucial. 
In the usual Marxist economic model, here’s what we think when we imagine 
the growth of  capitalism: more and more commodification. Everything gets 
generalised into the cash nexus, into the purchase and sale of  commodities. 
That’s hugely important. I want to suggest a different point of  view, however. 
This understands that capitalism organises through a tripartite division of  
work. Paid work remains central in this alternative. What we have to explain 
is how the world proletariat expands through qualitative transformations of  
the unpaid work/energy of  human and extra-human natures. We need to 
explain the expanded reproduction of  the world proletariat in relation to its 
wider conditions of  reproduction. 
This leads us to a different geography of  accumulation and class struggle. It 
asks us to understand how the production of  surplus value is rooted in the 
appropriation of  the largely unpaid work of  “women, nature and colonies”. 
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If  world accumulation is to be sustained, these dimensions of  unpaid work 
must grow disproportionately to the amount of  paid work. Why is that? Well, 
for a very simple reason. Capitalism, as everyone learns the first week when 
you study Marx, is dynamic because it produces more material throughput 
for every unit of  labour time. Workers become more physically productive. 
They also become more expensive. Marx put his finger on a crucial 
dimension of  the process in his general law of  underproduction.15 For 
expanded accumulation to remain profitable, capital has to find ways 
to cheapen what Marx calls ‘circulating capital’ – raw materials, energy, 
and other inputs used up in a given production cycle. Circulating capital 
is part of  constant capital – which Marxists usually characterise as 
machinery. Machines are fixed capital, and just one element of  constant 
capital. That fixed capital is worthless without circulating capital, and 
the more innovation there is in fixed capital, the more circulating capital 
is demanded. That’s why, for Marx, the fixed capital of  the steam engine 
became central to large-scale industry only after the volume of  cotton, 
the circulating capital, increased sharply and its value decreased sharply. 
“For expanded accumulation to remain 
profitable, you have to find ways to cheapen 
what Marx calls ‘circulating capital’ – raw 
materials, energy, and other inputs used up 
in a given production cycle”
You also have to keep the costs of  labour power cheap, which is not easy. 
In highly proletarianised societies, labour is expensive and becomes more 
expensive over time, as opportunities for non-market income contract and 
the cost of  living rises. This is of  course a process of  class struggle in many 
ways – not just in the form of  strikes and rebellions, but also in the class 
struggle from above. The great transition from coal to oil over the course 
of  the twentieth century was one such moment, a protracted effort to rid 
capitalism of  contentious workers who not only threatened social peace but 
also Cheap Energy.16 
In contrast to the generalisation of  the capital model, this alternative asks 
us to consider capitalism as a system in which islands of  commodification 
are surrounded by oceans of  Cheap – or potentially Cheap – Natures. Great 
15 Marx K (1981) Capital, vol. III, New York: Penguin 
16 Mitchell T (2011) Carbon Democracy, London: Verso
Winter 2017 |  189
© 2017 The Author/s. IPPR Progressive Review © 2017 IPPR
booms occur when these islands draw upon oceans of  Cheap Natures: of  
African slaves, of  Persian Gulf  oil, of  English coal, Baltic timber, American 
grain, Mississippi cotton, and on and on. 
Capitalism thrives when the cash nexus is modest in relation to accumulation 
by appropriation. In contrast to the direct exploitation of  surplus value in 
commodity production, accumulation by appropriation names those extra-
economic forms of  acquiring surplus work/energy in service to capital 
accumulation – but not yet, or not largely, monetised. Crucially, this is a 
zone of  tremendous violence and cultural domination. 
If  then we return to our thinking about 1492 and its role in the origins 
of  planetary crisis, we have to be willing to open our imagination about 
how capitalism works, about how the surplus is extracted, about how value 
production works. In 1492, for the first time in the 175 million years since 
the breakup of  Pangea, species bridges were created across the Atlantic 
issue, transforming life to this day. 
These were also bridges of  guns, commerce, and commodity production. In 
forging this modern Pangea, early capitalism was able to set two continents 
of  potential work/energy at the service of  capital accumulation. It wasn’t 
just plunder. Our modern Pangea was thoroughly productivist, marked by 
establishment of  massive productive systems, especially in silver mining in 
places like the Andes and in sugar planting in northeastern Brazil and the 
Caribbean. And just as capital is always in search of  a new profit-making 
opportunity, so too did each production complex go through a long boom 
and then bust, followed by the rise of  new production complexes, new 
commodity frontiers.  
Why? Because capitalism always needs to find not just new frontiers that 
can be just as productive, but new and expanded frontiers that can be 
even more productive. 
THE EMERGENT BINARIES OF CAPITALISM
Here is an alternative to what I like to call the ‘vampire model of  green 
thought’: capitalism comes to Planet Earth and sucks it dry. There’s some 
truth to that depletion model, but I don’t think it tells us a lot about how 
capitalism works in the web of  life, or about the specific entanglements 
of  planetary and capitalist crisis today. For one thing, capitalism’s biggest 
problem today is arguably not about resource “taps” at all, but in the 
pollution “sink” – above all the enclosure of  the global atmosphere as a 
dumping ground for greenhouse gases. 
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“Creating new binaries of gender, of race, 
and of Nature/Society... emerged as real 
abstractions out of the bloody processes of 
conquest and domination”
Capitalism’s decisive task is to transform the biosphere’s work/energy into 
value, premised on labour productivity. But there’s a catch: rising labour 
productivity is realised by excluding most humanly productive work, 
especially so-called women’s work. Creating new binaries of  gender, of  race, 
and of  Nature/Society was never something limited to philosophers. These 
emerged as real abstractions out of  the bloody processes of  conquest and 
domination, and they were central to the consolidation of  capitalism. The 
pedestal of  socially necessary labour time is socially necessary unpaid work/
energy. This was fundamental to the emergence of  capitalism in treating 
uncommodified natures of  every kind as a lever of  wealth production that 
was quickly transmuting into capital. 
This capitalism emerged out of  the historic defeat of  the feudal ruling 
classes in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the aftermath of  the 
Black Death. It’s important to remember that the collapse of  medieval 
Europe was a historic class defeat of  Europe’s ruling classes – a defeat of  
such proportions that Europe’s One Percent was forced to invent a new 
mode of  production. 
One way in which this happened was through the marriage of  military 
power in Iberia with a kind of  slaving and banking regime that came out of  
Genoa. With it came a series of  ethnic cleansing campaigns in Iberia with 
the Reconquista, in the Atlantic islands of  the Canaries and then, of  course, 
with Columbus’ journey.17 
This era witnessed a revolution in the scale, scope and speed of  environmental 
change. What took feudal Europe centuries to accomplish happened in 
decades, or even years, in early capitalism. To get a sense of  just how profound 
these landscape transformations were, take Picardy, in northeastern France, 
in the 12th and 13th Century. It took 200 years to clear 12,000 hectares of  
forest. Four centuries later, in northeastern Brazil, at the height of  the sugar 
boom in Bahia in the 1650s, 12,000 hectares of  forest would be cleared in a 
single year. That’s two orders of  magnitude, and it was not exceptional. Early 
capitalism marked as great an environment-making revolution in the history 
17 Patel R and Moore JW (2017), A History of  the World in Seven Cheap Things, University of  California Press
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of  humankind as anything seen since the dawn of  settled agriculture. 
This environment-making revolution was of  course material – but 
“material” in ways that include cultural change with and within machines, 
power, geology and biology. It was an ecological revolution in Merchant’s 
fertile conception, an interpenetrated web of  transformations in production 
and reproduction and culture.18 To be sure, this early capitalist ecological 
revolution was an epochal movement of  primitive accumulation. And if  
that process is often reckoned in terms of  enclosure, these enclosures 
extended well beyond property lines and hedges. Primitive accumulation 
was also about the forcible expulsion of  many humans from Society; 
it was about the production of  Nature, Society, European, and other 
pernicious real abstractions, all fundamental to capitalist development 
and colonial rule. 
It’s no accident that these words – Nature and Society – assumed their 
familiar meanings in the century after 1550.
The dawn of  England’s coal revolution really began in earnest in the 1530s, 
reaching critical mass by 1560, at which point most of  England’s major 
coalfields were being worked. England’s non-agricultural population rapidly 
expanded, growing twice as fast as the agricultural population. By 1549, 
Kett’s Rebellion was defeated, the high tide of  a growing resistance to 
capitalist transformation in the countryside. And let’s not forget the Irish. 
By 1541, England intensified colonial rule in Ireland and, in a telling letter, 
one of  Henry VIII’s advisors, the Earl of  Northampton, urged colonial 
administrators to “draw all the wild Irish that dwell now dispersed in the 
woods” and resettle them into English-style towns.19
This was part of  a discourse that shaped policy around the wild and 
the civil, Nature and Society. It was not an isolated moment in the rise 
of  capitalism. It was a move that prefigured Spanish colonial policy in 
Peru during the 1570s. The Spanish reorganised 1.5 million people – the 
population of  Portugal at the time – in order to supply Cheap Labour 
to the mines of  Potosí. Potosí’s silver veins had bled dry by the 1560s, 
intensifying Spain’s fiscal woes and threatening capital accumulation 
across western Europe. No American silver coming out of  Potosí meant 
no Amsterdam, meant no Baltic, and no European shipping ruling the 
18 Merchant C (1989) Ecological revolutions, Chapel Hill: University of  North Carolina Press 
19 Moore JW (2017) ‘The Capitalocene, Part I: On the Nature and Origins of  Our Ecological Crisis’, The Journal 
of  Peasant Studies, 44, no. 3, 594-630
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waves of  the Atlantic world. This was as fundamental a moment in the 
history of  the modern world as the rotary steam engine.20
This pattern was replayed many times in the history of  the modern world 
from the Dutch in South East Asia in the 1620s, all the way to the American 
Empire’s Strategic Hamlet Programme in southern Vietnam in the 1960s. 
Just as the English viewed the Irish as savage, the Castilians called indigenous 
Peruvians naturales, a term that went from meaning the inhabitant of  a town 
to, in a colonial context, being part of  Nature. 
“Just as the English viewed the Irish as 
savage, the Castilians called indigenous 
Peruvians naturales, a term that went from 
meaning the inhabitant of a town to, in a 
colonial context, being part of Nature”
It’s important to remember that in primitive accumulation, it’s not only 
people who were expelled from the land. Most human beings in this 
era, women, peoples of  colour, indigenous peoples, were expelled from 
membership in humanity. They were relocated: into the zone of  Nature. 
This was not only a history of  colonialism. It is also a story of  the gendered 
counterrevolution of  early modern Europe. One thing that is now clear 
from a growing body of  social and cultural history, and I think articulated 
well by Silvia Federici, is that early modern Europe saw a refashioning 
of  the gendered life of  early capitalist Europe into Man, Woman, Public 
and Private. (This was expressed dramatically by the witch hunts.) That 
counter-revolution would be codified in Locke’s political theory, which 
was not only about Improvement and who was capable of  that (white 
men), but also announced a deeply hierarchical gender dualism of  public 
and private spheres. By 1700, the definition of  women as non-workers 
was nearly completed.21
So, here we have Nature and Society, Man and Woman, Black and White, the 
West and the Rest, as pivotal binaries – real abstractions and fundamental 
levers of  the production of  surplus value and of  labour productivity. These 
20 Moore JW (2010) ‘Amsterdam is standing on Norway,  part I: The alchemy of  capital, empire, and nature in 
the diaspora of  silver, 1545–1648’, Journal of  Agrarian Change 10, no. 1, 35–71; Moore JW (2010) ‘Amsterdam 
is standing on Norway, part II: The global North Atlantic in the ecological revolution of  the long 
seventeenth century’, Journal of  Agrarian Change 10, no. 2, 188–227
21 Federici S (2004) Caliban and the Witch, New York: Autonomedia; Patel R and Moore JW, A History of  the 
World in Seven Cheap Things
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served not just as new systems of  cultural domination, but were wrapped 
up in a wider cosmology of  who was – and who was not – part of  Society, 
and part of  Nature. 
This had quite tangible economic effects. From the 1480s, prices in 
Europe for a wide range of  commodities began to move upwards, and, 
no surprise here, prices increased faster than wages. Furthermore, the 
powerful and institutionally grounded system of  gendered domination 
– through witch hunts, new laws, surveillance techniques and the rest 
– meant that women’s wages were suppressed even faster than men’s. 
Here’s the gender surplus at work. It was a crucial moment of  primitive 
accumulation – and remained so in the cyclical restructuring of  gender 
relations across the ensuing centuries.
Racialised surpluses were no less important. Drawing on a rich tradition 
of  banking, war, and slaving in the Mediterranean, the Genoese and 
Iberians stumbled upon the epochal equivalent of  killing two birds 
with one stone. From its origins on Madeira, to which we’ll return in 
a moment, the twin inventions of  cash-crop monoculture and modern 
slavery have continued to shape our lives five centuries later. Enslaved 
Africans on islands like Madeira and São Tomé were some of  the first 
workers subjected to what Orlando Patterson calls “social death”.22 
These workers were banished from Society. While slaves in pre-modern 
civilisations had always been outsiders, they still had rights. They were 
still enmeshed within reciprocal linkages. 
Not so with the emergence of  modern slavery, premised on the ideal 
proletarian: rightless and without a place in Civilisation. It was for sure a 
movement of  social death, and also a savagely modern form of  human 
sacrifice: of  a quarter-million Africans shipped to northeastern Brazil after 
1600, just 60,000 could be found in 1650. Of  2.2 million slave departures 
from Africa in the two centuries after 1492, just 300,000 Africans were 
living in the Americas by 1700. The carnage of  the slave/sugar nexus would 
be unfathomable if  subsequent holocausts were not there to remind us that 
mass extermination is the normal state of  the Capitalocene.23 
Early capitalism emerged through its frontiers near and far, in homes 
and families no less than across the oceans and continents. It would be 
22 Patterson O (1982) Slavery and social death, Cambridge: Harvard University Press
23 Moore JW (2017) ‘The Capitalocene, Part I’; and McBrien J (2016) ‘Accumulating extinction’, in Anthropocene 
or Capitalocene?, ed. Moore JW, 116–37, Oakland: PM Press
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dangerous to think that capitalism in the twentieth century freed itself  
from frontiers of  Cheap Nature. What is the coalmine or the oilfield, but a 
subterranean frontier?
“Imagined as a globe, the earth could 
‘become an object of appropriation for a 
collective humanity’: for Society.  Is it mere 
coincidence that our earliest surviving 
globe dates from 1492?”
Every frontier movement, as we are seeing, is a movement not only to secure 
extra-human natures but also Cheap Labour. That means we do better to 
speak not of  labour and nature, but of  labour in nature and nature in labour. 
This is crucial to the kind of  political ontology of  work that is necessary if  we 
are to reimagine the political challenges of  the present around climate justice, 
around precarity, around all manner of  economic justice.
EARLY CAPITALISM’S ENVIRONMENT-MAKING REVOLUTION
Early capitalism invented the global environment. This is true in at least 
three major ways. One is the transformation of  a spherical conception of  
the earth into a global conception. That was no small thing, either practically 
or in the imagination. Imagined as a globe, the earth could “become an 
object of  appropriation for a collective humanity”: for Society.24 Is it mere 
coincidence that our earliest surviving globe dates from 1492? If  one could 
conquer the globe only once one imagined it, it’s still the case that one needs 
practical tools for doing so: the modern map. So valuable were specific 
maps that they were in the sixteenth century “metaphorically and financially 
compared to the purchasing of  the spices, pepper, silk and precious metals.”25 
That process was complemented by the colonial networks of  naturalists, 
who collected information about climate, flora, fauna, and anything else 
that was potentially valuable. By the middle of  the eighteenth century – the 
timing is significant – there emerged a “global environmental sensibility” 
that included an awareness of  the rapidity of  environmental transformation 
in the tropical colonies.26
It was the scale, scope, and speed of  environmental transformation, 
enabled by the cartographic and botanical revolutions, that demonstrates 
24  Ingold T (1993) ‘Globes and spheres’, in Environmentalism, ed. K Milton, 31–42. New York: Routledge
25  Brotton J (1997) Trading territories, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
26  Grove RH (1995) Green imperialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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early capitalism’s use of  Nature as a productive force. As I’ve mentioned, 
it was in Madeira, São Tomé, and then Brazil that we see the origins of  
the relationship between agriculture and slavery that would shape the 
world all the way to the twenty-first century. Madeira’s accessible forests 
were mowed down so fast that it went from being the Atlantic’s top sugar 
producer in 1510 to being virtually shut down just fifteen years later. 
When the sugar plantations reached São Tomé, deforestation proceeded 
at a furious pace. But this time the very scale of  new sugar plantations – 
giant mill-plantation complexes, each with hundreds of  slaves – worked 
against the masters. African slaves escaped to the interior of  the island, and 
organised fierce resistance, laying siege to the island’s capital for two weeks 
in 1596. Besieged on an island so close to Africa, the Portuguese quickly 
offshored their production to northeastern Brazil by the 1570s, where King 
Sugar would rule for centuries. But here again, deforestation, war, and the 
brutality of  the labour regime would undermine profitability, and the sugar 
frontier once again moved. This time, sugar laid seige to the Caribbean, 
producing one biological wasteland after another in the century after 1650. 
The profits from this wave of  the sugar frontier would be pivotal in the 
capital formation of  late eighteenth century Britain. This was another 
reminder that industrialisation was propelled not only by class struggles at 
home, but also by the wretched fruits of  a slave system that was as industrial 
as anything seen in nineteenth century Manchester. The surplus profits of  
“social death” continue to shape life and power and climate today.
This was far from a narrowly colonial story. Before Potosí’s silver veins 
were opened, Central Europe’s bled freely. In mountainous regions like 
the Erzgebirge, on the border between present-day Germany and the 
Czech Republic, there was a mining and metallurgical revolution without 
precedent in medieval Europe. The basic raw materials – copper and 
iron – and the indispensable metallic basis of  sound money, silver, were 
produced here. Here are the extractivist origins of  industrial capitalism – as 
industrial a process as any we would see until the late nineteenth century. 
Sprawling infrastructures – canals, roads, towns, and of  course mines – 
were constructed virtually overnight. This extractivist revolution in the 
century after 1450 would culminate in the German Peasant War of  1525 – a 
revolt against the widespread destruction and enclosure of  the forests and 
a proletarian insurrection all at once. Mining, as with sugar, would be forced 
outwards, to northern European and New World frontiers. 
This was also a story of  agricultural revolution in the emergent cores – 
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here as so often, the story begins not in England but elsewhere. In the 
Low Countries, medieval peasants had dug out so much peat that by the 
fourteenth century the region was literally sinking into the North Sea. The 
result, as Brenner reminds, was a process analogous to the “classic” instance 
of  primitive accumulation in the English countryside: in both instances, 
cultivators were forced to sell to survive, to pursue labour productivity 
advance under competitive rents.27 The result was a spectacular acceleration 
of  proletarianisation and urbanisation. If  one looks closely at the Dutch in 
the seventeenth century we can see virtually every major feature of  large-
scale industry credited to the English two centuries later. Production was 
increasingly mechanised, as in sawmilling; standardised parts were deployed 
in manufacturing, especially in shipbuilding; modern financial markets were 
developed, underscored by the formation of  the Amsterdam Bourse in 
1602. And it was all underwritten by an agricultural system that did what all 
capitalist agricultures must do: produce more and more food with less and 
less labour-time. 
The Dutch fed themselves through an informal colonial relationship 
with the Baltic, whose modest grain surpluses underwrote the era’s rapid 
proletarianisation and urbanisation. That agro-food metabolism exhausted 
the soils and bodies of  serf  cultivation in Poland, such that by 1700 England 
became the granary of  northern Europe. But the English agricultural 
revolution, consolidated rapidly after Kett’s defeat in 1549, was not 
immune to the metabolism of  capitalist agriculture: after 1750 England’s 
grain exports halted, and per capita food consumption actually declined in 
England over the next half-century.
Both Dutch and English capitalism had, moreover, depended on the extended 
Baltic for vital raw materials. A common expression in the seventeenth-
century Dutch Republic was ‘Amsterdam is Standing on Norway’: at once 
a metaphor of  semi-colonial dominance and a very literal description of  
Amsterdam, supported by timbers drawn from southern Norway. The 
global fleets of  the Dutch and English were built with timber, tar, and pitch 
from a rolling forest-products frontier, beginning in the sixteenth century 
and not closing until well into the nineteenth century. The Baltic supplied 
not merely timber and shipbuilding supplies, but also potash from wood 
for bleaching – a demand that induced devastating deforestation from the 
Vistula to the western, then northern, Dvina as far north as Archangel. 
27 Brenner R (2001) ‘The Low Countries in the transition to capitalism’, Journal of  Agrarian Change 1,  
no. 2, 169–241
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And if  the old Nef  thesis of  English deforestation leading to coal has 
come under attack in recent years,28 it’s nevertheless firmly established that 
England produced no more iron in 1750 than it had in 1620 – Cheap Energy 
from England’s forests had reached a historical limit. The growing margin 
of  rising iron consumption in England – recall that about 15 per cent of  
English iron consumption was devoted exclusively to making horseshoes 
– came from Sweden. And even in Sweden, the forests were pushed back, 
with a new iron-producing region rising to preeminence every 25 years or 
so in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
And if  we are concerned with fossil fuels, let’s remember that these too 
were an invention of  the sixteenth century. People surely knew about 
coal, in England as in China, for a very long time. The Romans called 
coal Britain’s “best stone.”29 It took specific relations of  power, capital, 
and nature to turn these glorious stones – or in the case of  peat, matted 
vegetation – into fossil fuels. We should not begin with coal, but rather 
with peat, the youngest of  the fossil fuels, with about half  the energy 
density of  coal by weight. Indeed, Dutch capitalism was propelled by 
cheap peat and, after that, imported coal. Here was Cheap Energy for 
sure: extraordinary amounts of  energy delivered with very low outlays 
of  money and power. And like our other frontiers, peat extraction was 
subjected to the same dynamic of  boom and bust that we’ve seen in 
mining, and sugar cultivation, and in the Baltic. 
“The great problem of early capitalism was 
what Marx called underproduction, not as 
Malthus had it, but in the sense that the 
industrial dynamism of capitalism tended to 
outrun the raw materials sectors that could 
supply them cheaply”
All this provides a sense of  the rapidity, and the scale and the scope of  
early capitalist transformation, which resembled the fundamental dynamics 
of  later capitalism in nearly every respect. Early capitalism was, however, 
distinctive in its major form of  economic crisis. The great problem of  
early capitalism was what Marx called underproduction, not as Malthus had 
it, but in the sense that the industrial dynamism of  capitalism tended to 
outrun the raw materials sectors that could supply them cheaply. 
28 Nef  JU (1932) The Rise of  the British Coal Industry, London: Routledge
29 Freese B (2003) Coal: A Human History, New York: Basic Books
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Coal and then oil banished underproduction as a major problem. This was 
the epochal achievement of  the long fossil boom. The active contradiction 
became one of  selling the commodities that were produced, rather than 
securing the cheap raw materials that were necessary to produce them. 
And yet, Marx’s “general law” of  underproduction was not banished; the 
agencies of  fossil capitalism merely counteracted the tendency. Today, 
skyrocketing extraction costs signal a likely return to early capitalism’s 
central economic contradiction: underproduction.30
After 1750, this largely Dutch-led capitalism, enmeshed in all these different 
moments of  environmental transformation, began to exhaust itself. Early 
capitalism’s socio-ecological contradictions deepened and resistance to 
agrarian capitalism, from Russia to Peru, intensified. While this moment 
of  1750 is often celebrated as the dawn of  capitalism, I’m not sure that’s 
as useful as we want to think. The ability to move from using coal and 
peat as thermal energy to mechanical energy was huge. But this seems to 
have amplified – in a largely quantitative way – the dynamics and strategies 
of  Cheap Nature established in the early modern centuries. One of  the 
temptations has been to narrow the geography and the history of  “the” 
Industrial Revolution to England and coal and the steam engine. No one 
of  course denies that these are important dimensions of  an important 
transition. But we should be cautious about giving too much analytical 
power to machines and resources, and about conceptualising these within a 
fairly narrow geographical or sociological compass. 
For one thing, it’s far from certain that the rotary steam engine after 1784 is 
even the most important technology of  its era. One could readily argue that 
it was the cotton gin that enabled the steam engine’s geohistorical impact. 
Invented in the 1780s and ‘90s, the new gin made possible a dramatic 
leap forward in labour productivity – removing seeds from cotton was 
an arduous task – and enabled the rapid spread of  a fuzzy-seeded short 
staple cotton across the American South. It was a pivotal moment as well 
in the formation of  a “second” and highly industrialized slavery across the 
Western Hemisphere.31 With Marx, it was the fall in the price of  cotton 
that made large-scale industry possible, and this cotton was cultivated by 
African slaves on lands that had been conquered from indigenous peoples, 
who were  pushed out or exterminated. To put it in these terms completely 
re-frames our usual narrative of  industrialisation… and of  capitalism.
30 Moore JW (2015) Capitalism in the Web of  Life, Verso
31 Tomich D (2004) ‘Atlantic History and World Economy: concepts and constructions’, ProtoSociology, 20, 102-121
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NEOLIBERALISM AND THE EXHUASTION OF CHEAP 
NATURE: TOWARDS AN ECOLOGY OF HOPE
The crises of  early capitalism were resolved through the combination of  
new technologies, new imperial and political forms, and new frontiers. 
Capitalism’s secret sauce is that last moment. For the new frontiers opened, 
conquered, secured, and disciplined over the long nineteenth century set the 
stage both for the great boom of  the post-World War II and the troubled 
history of  capitalism in the neoliberal era. 
There were two big problems for neoliberalism as it began to take shape 
out of  the crises of  the 1970s. One was that the sources of  potentially 
Cheap Nature were fewer than ever before and the piles of  money looking 
for profitable investment were bigger than ever before. This surplus capital 
problem was resolved through forms of  frontier expansion that paled in 
comparison with the conquests of  South Asia or the Americas or Africa 
in previous centuries, and also through varied movements of  accumulation 
by dispossession.32 Strikingly, the labour productivity revolution much 
anticipated in the 1970s – promising full automation and all the rest – never 
materialised. I’ve written elsewhere about this, so I just want to underscore 
how the relatively modest frontiers of  the 1970s seemed to compel a return 
to the most savage forms of  primitive accumulation and politically-enforced 
accumulation. I’m struck by the parallels between early capitalism’s bloody 
expropriations and the stark realities illuminated by radical critiques of  
neoliberalism’s doctrines, mass incarceration, and the “disposable third 
world woman worker”.33 But where early capitalism’s violence established 
the conditions of  vigorous accumulation, neoliberal violence has been 
more adept at accumulating misery than capital.
It’s true that neoliberal capitalism did, in a way, restore Cheap Nature. 
Food prices fell, oil prices stabilised after 1983, labour costs were rolled 
back through capitalist class offensives across the world. What we saw 
in the neoliberal moment around agriculture, however, was something 
that we had never seen before - the attempt to re-establish capital 
accumulation on the basis of  stagnant productivity. Agro-biotechnology 
and its toxic regime, after 1990 or so, has failed to restore agricultural 
productivity growth in the established cores of  industrial agriculture in 
32 Harvey D (2003) The New Imperialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press
33 See, for example, Klein N (2007) The Shock Doctrine, New York: Metropolitan Books and Wright MW (2006) 
Disposable Women and Other Myths of  Global Capitalism, New York: Routledge; and Gilmore RW (2007) Golden 
Gulag, Berkeley: University of  California Press.
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Western Europe, in North American, in the Punjab. There is no more 
expressive contradiction of  late capitalism’s crisis: a steady deceleration of  
agricultural productivity growth is the law of  value’s most basic condition. 
It’s not only that the capitalist agricultural model is broken and resisted. 
It’s also that climate change renders both geographical and technical fixes 
to the agro-ecological crisis a dead letter.34
The second great problem faced by neoliberal capitalism is closely related, 
and has materialised strongly over the past decade. This is negative-value: 
the emergence of  forms of  nature, including social movements, that could 
no longer be resolved through the old productivist fixes. Negative-value 
comprises forms of  life and politics that cannot be resolved through the 
old redistributionist strategies of  capitalism, through the old strategy of  
thinking nature as a productivist resource.35
“There will be no effective politics 
of climate justice without putting 
agriculture at the centre”
Climate change – understood as a geohistorical event – is surely the greatest 
source of  negative-value, and this mean we have to address the basic 
capitalist agricultural model at its core. There will be no effective politics 
of  climate justice without putting agriculture at the centre. The OECD – 
hardly a bastion of  radical thought - says that by 2035, agriculture will bear 
one third of  the global economic damages arising from climate change. By 
2060, this figure will have risen to two thirds.36 Climate change is already 
suppressing the big four cereal crops of  soya beans, rice, maize and wheat – 
between 1980 and 2005, David Lobell and his colleagues found that maize 
and wheat production were supressed by 3.8 per cent and 5.5 per cent.37 
Worse still, rising CO2 concentrations are reducing the protein, zinc and 
iron content of  cereal crops at a moment when nutrient deficiencies already 
affect about three billion people. 
The non-linear activation of  negative value today not only represents a limit 
to capital in Marx’s sense – a dialectical antagonism between capital’s fantasy 
34 Moore JW (2010) ‘The End of  the road? Agricultural revolutions in the capitalist world-ecology’, 1450–
2010, Journal of  Agrarian Change, 10, no. 3, 389–413
35 Moore JW (2015) ‘Cheap food and bad climate’, Critical Historical Studies 2, no. 1: 1–43
36 Braconier H et al (2014) ‘Policy Challenges for the Next 50 Years’, OECD Economic Policy Paper No. 9, 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
37 Lobell DB, Schlenker W, Costa-Roberts J (2011) ‘Climate trends and global crop production since 1980’, 
Science, 333(6042), 616-620
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of  a perfectly interchangeable machine-like world and the web of  life as an 
unruly and resistant mosaic of  relationships – but also a clear threat to 
planetary life of  every kind. The danger today is that global capital and the 
forces of  empire will continue to behave as if  negative value does not exist. 
Part of  this response is to bury one’s head in the sand. The bourgeoisie has 
its share of  flat-earthers. Another part, and this may be even more deadly, 
is to behave as if  the old strategies of  genocide, privatisation, and enclosure 
will yield the same results. But they won’t – climate as a geohistorical force 
is now not only drawing the curtains on any meaningfully new frontier of  
Cheap Nature; it is inverting the cost reducing mechanism of  accumulation 
by appropriation. For climate change is, above all, costly – for capital, and 
for those of  us who live under its rule.
MOVEMENTS OF INTERRELATED ECOLOGIES
In response, a family of  movements has emerged that strive to connect 
particular moments of  injustice with larger webs of  power, capital, and 
nature. There movements represent a new ontological politics. A good 
example of  this politics is food sovereignty, which says that the right of  
peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through 
ecologically sustainable methods necessitates new social relations free 
of  oppression and exploitation. This is a concept of  food that links it to 
power, justice and nature, all at the same time. I think this is a decisive 
political moment of  a new ontological politics presenting demands that say: 
“we are not simply asking for more calories; we are saying that the right of  
food is about justice, the right to a liveable planet.”38 
This gives a sense of  how the political economy and the political ecology 
of  capitalism are wrapped up with each other and how they are wrapped 
up with and within the web of  life. This is a part of  what I and others 
are calling the world-ecology conversation.39 This is important because it’s 
fundamental to asking what is the common ground of  a radical politics 
today? Does consumption give us what we need? Does sustainability give 
us what we need? I think there are probably many possibilities, but work is 
central. And work gives us a way to bring together radical politics that takes 
the dynamics of  exploitation and oppression in paid work, the unpaid work 
of  social reproduction and in the unpaid work of  nature as a whole to find 
common ground.
38 Wittman HK et al, eds (2010) Food Sovereignty, Halifax, NS: Fernwood
39 See especially the articles and books collected on academia.edu (https://www.academia.edu/Documents/
in/World-Ecology) and on the World-Ecology Research Network’s website (https://worldecologynetwork.
wordpress.com/new-world-ecology-articles-and-books/).
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“emancipatory politics has to stop drawing 
lines around who’s work and whose lives 
matter and whose do not”
I want to conclude on a few simple, but provocative, and hopefully 
generative, points. 
First, emancipatory politics has to stop drawing lines around who’s work 
and whose lives matter and whose do not. The worker is not only waged, 
but unwaged, not only human but extra-human. 
Second, world-ecological thinking - that is to see that we are all embedded in 
the web of  life and vice versa - can help us see whose lives and whose work 
are strategically located within capitalism’s world-ecological contradictions. 
Simply being the most exploited or most oppressed doesn’t make you 
strategically positioned to destabilise business as usual. What’s crucial to 
our politics are analyses that show not just the severity of  the problems – in 
the biosphere and in capitalism – but also how these shifting entanglements 
may provide opportunities for emancipatory politics.
And finally, we can and should make our slogan this: “No politics of  nature 
without work and no politics of  work without nature.” The question of  
life and work can no longer be enclosed within Society. To quote Thomas 
Münzer, a central figure in the German Peasant War of  1525, “The creatures 
too must become free”. 
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